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IN THE SUPREME COURT
STATE OF UTAH
UTAH STATE RETIREMENT BOARD, as
trustee of UTAH STATE RETIREMENT
FUND, a common trust fund,
Plaintiff/Appellee,
Case No. 900302
v.
PRICEVIEW, LTD., a Utah limited
partnership; PRICE K.M., a Utah
limited partnership; FRANZ C.
STANGL, III, individually and as
Personal Representative of the
Estate of ELIZABETH ANN STANGL; and
JOHN DOES 1 THROUGH 20,
Defendants/Appellants.

JURISDICTION
This is an appeal from a judgment of the Seventh Judicial
District Court.

This Court's jurisdiction is based on Utah Code

Ann. § 78-2-2(3) (j) (1992) and Rule 3 of the Utah Rules of
Appellate Procedure.
ISSUES PRESENTED FOR REVIEW
1.

Whether the trial court erred in refusing to allow

evidence concerning the parties' intent in entering into the
partnership agreement and loan transaction.
Standard of Review:

The appropriate standard of review is

the "correction of error" standard, with no deference being

given to the trial courtfs conclusion of law.

Williams v.

Miller, 794 P.2d 23, 25 (Utah Ct. App. 1990).

When

reviewing a finding based solely on written materials, the
appellate court is in as good a position as the trial court
to examine the evidence de novo.

In re Infant Anonymous,

760 P.2d 916 (Utah Ct. App. 1988).
2.

Whether the trial court erred in refusing to allow

evidence concerning the illegality of the loan.
Standard of Review;

The appropriate standard of review is

the "correction of error" standard, with no deference being
given to the trial court's conclusion of law.

Williams v.

Miller, 794 P.2d 23, 25 (Utah Ct. App. 1990).
3.

Whether the trial court erred in allowing interest on

the judgment amounts to be compounded monthly when the notes did
not explicitly call for compound interest.
Standard of Review:

The appropriate standard of review is

the "correction of error" standard, with no deference being
given to the trial court's conclusion of law.

Williams v.

Miller, 794 P.2d 23, 25 (Utah Ct. App. 1990).
4.

Whether the trial court erred in entering partially

duplicative judgments against Stangl individually.
Standard of Review:

The appropriate standard of review is

the "correction of error" standard, with no deference being
given to the trial court's conclusion of law.
Miller, 794 P.2d 23, 25 (Utah Ct. App. 1990).
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Williams v.

5.

Whether the trial court erred in refusing to recuse

itself.
Standard of Review;

The appropriate standard of review is

the "correction of error" standard, with no deference being
given to the trial court's conclusion of law.

Williams v.

Miller, 794 P.2d 23, 25 (Utah Ct. App. 1990).
DETERMINATIVE STATUTES
1.

Utah Code Ann. § 49-9-12 (1981 & Supp. 1986) , reproduced

as Exhibit E in the Addendum hereto.
2.

Utah Code Ann. § 78-37-1 (1992), reproduced as Exhibit F

in the Addendum hereto.
RELATED APPEAL
Appellant earlier appealed from the trial court's Partial
Summary Judgment and Order and Decree of Foreclosure which was
certified as final under Rule 54(b) of the Utah Rules of Civil
Procedure.

That appeal has been briefed.

This appeal was

consolidated with the earlier appeal.
STATEMENT OP THE CASE
In 1988, the Utah State Retirement Fund ("the Fund")
commenced this judicial foreclosure action against defendants.
Included in the Fundfs claims for relief were claims against
Franz C. Stangl, III, and Elizabeth Ann Stangl (now deceased) on
their guaranties, claims against Stangl and Price K.M. as general
partners, respectively, of Price K.M. and Priceview, Ltd.
Fund sought other relief relating to the dissolution of
3

The

Priceview, Ltd. such as an accounting and payment of partnership
distributions.
In August 1988, the trial court granted the Fund's motion
for the appointment of a receiver and sua sponte struck
defendants' tenth and eleventh defenses.

See Order Granting

Plaintiff's Motion for Appointment of Receiver and striking the
Tenth and Eleventh Defenses of Defendants' Answer, dated
September 12, 1988 (Exhibit 8 to Addendum of Brief of Appellant
dated March 28, 1991).
On January 31, 1990, the trial court entered summary judgment in favor of the Fund on the issue of the Fund's entitlement
to foreclose and on the Stangls' guaranties.

See Partial Summary

Judgment and Order and Decree of Foreclosure dated January 31,
1990 (Exhibit A to Addendum hereto).

Reserved for trial was the

issue whether any defendants would be liable for a deficiency
judgment following the foreclosure sale of the property based on
defendants' impairment of collateral defense.
Prior to the trial, defendants filed an Affidavit of Recusal
and Certification of Counsel.

The trial court entered a Finding

Relative to Sufficiency of Affidavit of Recusal dated May 15,
1990 (finding it to be insufficient), and certified the Affidavit
to the Honorable Don V. Tibbs of the Sixth Judicial District for
review.

Judge Tibbs denied the request for recusal.

See

Exhibits 13 and 14 to Addendum of Brief of Appellant dated March
28, 1991.
4

Trial to the court was held on January 30, 1991. The court
thereafter issued a Memorandum Decision on Trial Matters dated
March 1, 1991 (Exhibit D to Addendum hereto), entered Findings of
Fact and Conclusions of Law (Exhibit C to Addendum hereto) and a
Judgment dated June 13, 1991 (Exhibit B to Addendum hereto).
Defendants thereafter timely filed their Notice of Appeal to
this Court on July 12, 1991.
STATEMENT OF FACTS
The facts underlying the dispute between the parties in this
appeal are fully set forth in the Statement of Facts in the Brief
of Appellant dated March 28, 1991. Since these appeals have been
consolidated, defendants respectfully refer the Court to the
Statement of Facts in the original Brief of Appellant.
Additional procedural facts are set forth above, and critical testimony is set forth throughout the argument section of
this Brief.
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT
The conduct of the parties reveals an ambiguity in the
partnership agreement and loan transaction that does not exist on
the face of the documents.

Specifically, Stangl believed that

the Fund intended to make an equity investment, not a loan, but
that a "loan" was structured to provide valuable tax benefits to
Stangl.

Stangl did not intend to contribute $500,000 worth of

property in exchange for a 20% partnership interest and sole
personal liability on a $4,350,000 loan while the Fund
5

contributed $100 for an 80% partnership interest and assumed no
risk of loss.

In addition, the Fund carried the transaction on

its books as an equity, not as a loan, and not as a mixed
equity/loan transaction.

It was not until the shopping center

suffered financial difficulties that the Fund considered the
transaction a true loan.

Thus, the court erred in not allowing

or considering evidence of the parties1 true intent.

Their

conduct created an ambiguity which should have been explained
through the introduction of extrinsic evidence.
The Fund did not have the authority to make a loan to the
partnership.

Under Utah Code Ann. § 49-9-12(h) (1981), the Fund

only had the authority to make loans secured by Federal Housing
Administration or Veterans1 Administration insurance.
ly, the loan was ultra vires and void.

According-

The court's interpreting

the transaction as a loan was in error because it denied giving
the transaction a legal effect.
The court erred in allowing the Summary Judgment and the
Judgment to bear interest compounded monthly.

The notes do not

explicitly (or even implicitly) allow compounding.

In fact, the

notes only provide that when the principal balance is
accelerated, any then accrued but unpaid interest will be added
to the outstanding principal and that amount will then bear
interest at 18% before and after judgment.

Utah law does not

allow the compounding of interest unless the agreement explicitly
so provides.
6

The court improperly entered duplicative judgments against
Stangl.

While Stangl may be subject to personal liability in

different capacities, that is, as a general partner and as a
guarantor, that does not mean he should have two judgments
pending against him for the same liability.
The court refused to recuse itself when requested to do so
by Stangl before trial. At trial, however, the courtfs bias
against Stangl and Stangl1s position was fully revealed.

The

trial court should have recused itself.
ARGUMENT
I.
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN REFUSING TO ALLOW EVIDENCE
OF THE PARTIES' INTENT IN ENTERING THE TRANSACTION.
The trial court erred in ruling that the partnership
agreement and loan documents were unambiguous as a matter of law
and in refusing to allow parol evidence to show the parties1 true
intent.

Although the general rule is that a court will not allow

parol evidence to vary the terms of a written agreement which
appears to be unambiguous on its face, there are several
exceptions to this rule.

For example, parol evidence is allowed

to explain the meaning of documents when: (1) both parties to the
contract demonstrate a different meaning by their actions; and
(2) a latent ambiguity exists.

7

A.

The parties' conduct created an ambiguity because they both
treated the transaction as an equity investment.
The trial court erred in not allowing parol evidence to

explain the ambiguity in the documents which was caused by the
parties' conduct.

The Utah Supreme Court in Bullfrog Marina,

Inc. v. Lentz, 501 P.2d 266 (Utah 1972), stated that if parties
to a contract have demonstrated by their actions that an agreement means something different from that stated in writing, the
actions of the parties create an ambiguity and the intent of the
parties should then be enforced.
In Bullfrog, the parties entered into two separate
agreements which provided for the leasing of houseboats.

The

agreements consisted of an employment agreement, by which the
defendant became an employee of the plaintiff, and a lease, by
which the defendant leased to the plaintiff three houseboats for
two years.

The purpose of the separate agreements and the

structure of the transaction was to circumvent requirements of
the National Park Service with respect to concessions.

After

about one year, the Park Service began inquiring into the
operation and it appeared that the parties might not be able to
continue the houseboat rental operation under the current system.
The defendant then canceled the employment agreement pursuant to
its terms and also canceled the lease and removed the three
houseboats to another marina in order to continue his business.
The plaintiff, however, brought this action asserting that the
defendant did not have the right to remove the houseboats from
the plaintiff's marina because the lease clearly provided that
8

plaintiff was to have use of the houseboats for two years.

This

Court affirmed the trial court, which allowed the admission of
parol evidence to explain the documents, because the parties had
treated the transaction not as an employment situation and a
lease, but as the defendant's operating a separate business.

In

so holding, this Court stated that
when parties place their own construction on
their agreement and so perform, the court may
consider this as persuasive evidence of what
their true intention was. It is true that
the doctrine of practical construction may be
applied only when the contract is ambiguous;
but the question becomes ambiguous to whom?
Where the parties have demonstrated by their
actions and performance that to them the
contract meant something quite different, the
meaning and intent of the parties should be
enforced. In such a situation, the parties
by their actions have created the ambiguity
to bring the rule into operation. If this
were not the rule, the courts would be enforcing one contract when both parties had
demonstrated that they meant and intended the
contract to be quite different.
Id. at 271 (emphasis added).
In Bullough v. Sims, 400 P.2d 20 (Utah 1965), this Court
also held that parties to an agreement can create an ambiguity by
their actions.

The parties in Bullough entered an agreement

which unambiguously and clearly provided for a present sale of
the plaintiffs1 interests in a partnership as of the date of the
agreement and at the price which the partnership shares were then
worth.

The agreement further provided that until demand was made

for payment, the partnership would pay the appropriate share of
9

profits to each of the plaintiffs and the plaintiffs could not
interfere with management of the partnership*

After more than

twenty years, the plaintiffs demanded payment for their partnership shares at the present value, which had substantially
increased.

The defendant, however, tendered only the value of

the shares as of the date of the agreement, relying on the
language in the agreement.
Over a period of many years, the parties evidenced their
intention as to the meaning of the agreement that there had not
been a sale at the time the agreement was entered, but that they
contemplated operation as co-owners, and that the shares were to
be sold at market value as of the date of sale.

Although this

directly conflicted with the clear language in the written
agreement, the court allowed parol evidence to vary the terms of
the written agreement because "the parties by their actions have
created the •ambiguity1 required to bring the rule into operation."

Id. at 23.

The court further stated that

[t]his rule of practical construction is
predicated on the common sense concept that
*actions speak louder than words.'. . . Thus,
even if it be assumed that the words standing
alone might mean one thing to the members of
this court, where the parties have demonstrated bv their actions and performance that
to them the contract meant something quite
different, the meaning and intent of the
parties should be enforced.
Id. (emphasis added).
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This Court also held in EIE v. St. Benedicts Hospital, 638
P.2d 1190 (Utah 1981), that if the parties demonstrate by their
actions a meaning different from that expressed in a written
agreement, the intent of the parties should be enforced.

In EIE,

the parties entered an agreement under which the plaintiff would
provide paramedic services for the defendant.

The agreement

clearly stated that the defendants would pay plaintiffs "the
amount of $90.00 per call.11

Id. at 1192. Throughout the

relationship, however, the parties construed the defendants
obligation to be payment of 90% of the total amount billed for
paramedic services, not $90.00 per call as provided in the
agreement.

The $90.00-per-call figure came about because the

parties originally thought that each call would be billed at
$100.00, thus making the $90.00 equal to 90%. The plaintiff
never objected to these payments until their relationship began
to deteriorate.

At that time, the plaintiff made demands upon

the defendant for amounts allegedly due under the $90.00-per-call
provision.
Although noting the general rule that a complete and clear
agreement which the parties have reduced to writing will not be
varied by parol evidence, the court allowed parol evidence to
show that the parties intended that the plaintiff was to receive
only 90% of the total amount billed for paramedic services.

The

court stated that M[t]hough arguably clear on its face, where the
parties demonstrate by their actions that to them the contract
11

meant something quite different, the intent of the parties will
be enforced."

Id. at 1195 (citing Bullfrog Marina, Inc. v.

Lentz, 501 P.2d 266 (Utah 1972)).

See also

Concerning the

Application for Water Rights of the Town of Estes Park v.
Northern Colorado Water Conservancy Dist., 677 P.2d 320, 327
(Colo. 1984) ("It is also well-established that the parties1
construction of a contract before a dispute eirises is a
particularly persuasive aid in determining the true meaning of
the agreement).
In this case, although the loan documents appear to be
unambiguous, the parties consistently treated the transaction as
an equity investment.

During the trial, Mr. Stangl proffered

testimony that the parties1 intent was that the Fund would invest
the $4,350,000 in the shopping center as an equity.

The only

purpose for structuring the agreement as a loan was to provide
certain tax benefits to Mr. Stangl. Mr. Stangl testified by
proffer1 his understanding of the partnership/loan transaction
with the Fund:
Q. [By Mr. Hunt]

Okay. Now, with respect to the part-

nership agreement that was entered into between you and
The Fund about the same time, Exhibit P-4, what did you
contribute to that partnership?
1

Although the Court emphasized that it had earlier ruled that
the partnership agreement and loan documents presented no ambiguity, the Court allowed a proffer of testimony and evidence.
(Trial transcript of January 30, 1991 at 60-61).
12

A.

The $500,000 worth of land and improvements.

Q.

And what did you do, give a deed to the partnership or

something of that—
A.

Yes.

Q.

And what was your understanding what The Fund—What did

you get back for your contribution of that land?
A.

Twenty percent participation in the partnership.

Q.

Okay. Now, what did the Retirement Fund contribute to

the partnership?
A.

$100 and a loan for $4,350,000.

Q.

And what was your understanding of what The Fund got for

that contribution?
A.

Ownership of 80 percent of the shopping center and the

property that the partnership owned.
. . .

Q.

Now, I note as part of Exhibit D-9, there are—there 1 s

a—

We have loan—basically some loan documents; a note,

deed of trust, security instruments and personal guaranty.
Given the fact that you created a partnership, why did you
also have loan documents?

Did you have any understanding of

that?
•

A.

• •

There were several reasons.

The first and most

important one was a scorekeeping method for the Retirement
13

Fund to keep track of what their involvement with the
shopping center was.

They needed a conventional method of

keeping score, so that they could keep track of what
payments were made, if you will, of the preferential method
of who got paid what out of the proceeds that were generated
when the center was done.
In addition to that, there were special tax benefits
that the Retirement Fund was a non-taxable entity, and that
they had no desire or ability to get the tax benefits that
flowed from the shopping center.

It was a significant part

of the bargain, that I was to receive a hundred percent of
those tax benefits.

And the only way that I could receive a

hundred percent of those tax benefits was to be at risk,
which meant "sign a note."

I signed a note in order to get

those benefits.
There were other reasons for the other documents that
are involved here, but those were the two main purposes for
the reason for the note and the reason for the partnership
agreements, the way it was drawn.
Q.

With respect to those personal guaranties that you and

your wife, Elizabeth—your late wife, Elizabeth, signed, did
you understand that that exposed you to risk and you might
be required to actually pay money under those guaranties?
A.

No.

Q.

Why was that?
14

A.

I had a provision in the partnership agreement that

allowed me, in the event that things went to hell in a
handbasket, that the earth opened up and swallowed the
shopping center, that I could distribute in kind to my
partner, the shopping center and they would have a hundred
percent of the shopping center and I would have nothing.
was willing to accept that risk.

I

I was not willing to pay

for one hundred percent of the debt of an empty shopping
center to a partner. whofs the lender, and get back nothing
but paid receipts, and in the end have to give them 80
percent ownership in the property that I had to pay for.
was never part of the bargain: it was never negotiated.

It
It

never entered my mind in any way that that was going to be
required to do so.
(Trial transcript of January 30, 1991 at 73-77 (emphasis added)).
Moreover, Butch Johnson, the head investment officer at the
Fund with whom Mr. Stangl dealt, testified that the Fund treated
this transaction as an equity investment and even carried this
transaction on its books as an equity.

Mr. Johnson testified by

proffer:
Q.

Okay.

And if you know, how was the [1983] transaction

communicated to [Attorney Brent] Stevenson?
. . .

[A.]

Basically Mr. Stangl, myself, and Brent Stevenson sat

down in my office, went through the provisions that had been
15

negotiated, and outlined a format that could accomplish all
of the things that I've mentioned to convert this from a
participating loan to a partnership with just a loan against
the partnership.
Q.

Okay.

And was that ultimately accomplished, that

conversion?
A.

Yes. Mr. Stevenson prepared the documents and they were

signed.
Q.

Subsequently to that point, Mr. Johnson, if you know,

how did the—how did the State Retirement Fund carry the
Creekview property on their books?

Was it treated as a loan

or equity or both or do you know?
A.

It was treated as an equity.

(Trial transcript of January 30, 1991 (emphasis added)).
William Chipman, Butch Johnson's successor at the Fund, was
also questioned at trial about the Fund's characterization of the
transaction between the parties.

The court sustained an

objection to the question, stating:
Objection sustained. I do that on the ground what his
category or even what The Fund's category of treatment
as far as their internal operation is concerned does
not change the legal obligations on the parties as
reflected by the documents they executed. You could
call it anything you want and it still wouldn't change
the legal obligation. So that's the reason that the
Court is sustaining the objection.
Trial transcript of January 31, 1991 at 236-37.

16

Based on the foregoing authorities, the courtfs ruling on
the objection was plain error.
Mr. Chipman testified at his deposition, however:
Q.

. . . How were these participating loans carried on the

books of the Utah State Retirement Fund?

How were they

booked?
A.

I think it was all in a general ledger, real estate.

I

think each transaction had a number that was assigned to it.
A property number.

And my recollection is all the so-called

participate or convertible —
little differently.

they're all structured a

No two are exactly alike.

Had a number

sequence that was different from the all cash purchases.
But they were all shown under the same accounting data.

We

did have some subsidiary ledgers or subsidiary breakout
where we showed the participating mortgages separate from
the all cash purchases.
. . .

Q.

Do you recall how the annual audit reports reflected

these assets?

Were they separately broken out?

Real estate

equities and real estate loans or was it just real estate
assets and a number out to the side?
A.

Well, I think in the — main report, the annual report,

the auditors prepare just real estate, one category.

We

might have had a different report, a subsidiary ledger we

17

prepared on a separate page that broke it out into land,
office buildings, shopping centers, industrial properties.
Q.

I see.

A.

And there may even have been a participating mortgage

section.

And it varied from year to year how that was

represented.
. . .

Q.

You heard Mr. Johnson testify that he considered these

participating mortgages to be equities because the Fund had
greater than 50 percent position.

Did you share that

conclusion?
A.

Yes, I think I shared that with —

with him.

(Deposition of William Chipman (February 21, 1989) at 21-24.)
Because the parties1 actions have demonstrated an intent
different from that expressed in the written agreements, their
actions have created an ambiguity.

Accordingly, the trial court

erred by not allowing parol evidence as to the parties1 true
intent.
B.

Parol evidence should be admitted when there is a latent
ambiguity.
The trial court erred in not allowing parol evidence to show

the parties1 intent because a latent ambiguity exists.

When a

latent ambiguity exists, the trial court should allow extrinsic
evidence to resolve any ambiguity.

Hamada v. Valley National

Bank. 555 P.2d 1121, 1123 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1976).
18

In Hamada, a

third party obtained a series of loans from the plaintiff for
approximately $45,000, for which the third party pledged stock to
secure the loan.

Because the stock was in an obscure and small

company, the plaintiff required the defendant, who was a partner
of the third party, to agree to purchase the stock at a set price
upon demand by the plaintiff as security for the loan.

The

agreement clearly provided for a purchase of the shares upon
demand at a set price.

After the third party defaulted on the

loan, the plaintiff demanded that the defendant purchase the
stock as required by the agreement.

The court found that the

extrinsic evidence raised a question of whether the agreement was
intended by the parties to be an unconditional agreement to
purchase the stock or whether it was a guarantee.

If the agree-

ment were a guarantee, then it would not have been enforceable
since subsequent loans were made.

The court stated that

[a] latent ambiguity is one where the language employed is clear and intelligible and
suggests but a single meaning, but some extrinsic fact or extraneous evidence creates a
necessity for an interpretation or a choice
among two or more possible meanings. Since
the detection of the latent ambiguity requires a consideration of facts outside the
instrument itself, extrinsic evidence is
obviously admissible to prove the existence
of the ambiguity, as well as to resolve any
ambiguity proven to exist.
Id. at 1123.
The Oregon Court of Appeals in Rodway v. Arrow Light Truck
Parts, Inc., 772 P.2d 1349 (Or. Ct. App. 1989), similarly held
19

that extrinsic evidence should be allowed to show that there are
latent ambiguities.

The defendant and the third party defendant

in Rodway entered into an agreement to indemnify the defendant
from any personal liability "due to his status or activity as an
officer, director or shareholder of Arrow Light Truck Parts,
Inc."

Id. at 1351.

In return for the indemnification agreement,

the defendant sold his stock in Arrow to the third party defendant for a very reduced price.

The plaintiff subsequently

brought an action for damages pursuant to a lease which the
defendant signed prior to becoming an officer of Arrow, but after
the date of formation of the corporation.

The defendant asserted

that the indemnification agreement protected him from liability
based on the breach of this lease because the clear intent of the
parties was to indemnify him from any liability in relation to
his association with Arrow.
The court stated that
[i]n this case, the plain meaning of the term
•officer1 and •director1 could be interpreted
to exclude activities undertaken before [the
defendant's] formal election, but the application of the indemnity clause to [the defendant's] act of signing the lease creates a
latent or extrinsic ambiguity as to whether
the indemnity clause covers agreements signed
in furtherance of the existing corporation by
persons about to become officers and directors of that corporation.
Id. at 1351-52. Noting that a contract with unambiguous terms is
generally construed according to the plain meaning of those
terms, the court further stated that "extrinsic evidence may be
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used to show that there are latent ambiguities."

Id. at 1351.

See also Pistone v. Superior Court, 279 Cal. Rptr. 173, 177
(1991) ("no matter how clear and unambiguous a writing is on its
face, the rule allows admitting evidence to resolve a latent
ambiguity").
In the present case, a latent ambiguity exists in the combination of the partnership agreement and the loan documents and
the substantial difference in capital contributions and percentages of ownership.

Under the Fund's argument, when the parties

entered the partnership agreement, Mr. Stangl contributed the
real property, which contribution the partners valued at
$500,000, and received a 20% interest in the partnership.

The

Fund made a contribution of the loan of $4,350,000, which the
partners valued at $100, and received an 80% interest in the
partnership.

As Mr. Stangl testified at trial, it simply did not

make sense that he would contribute $500,000 to a partnership for
a 20% interest, and assume personal responsibility for a
$4,350,000 loan.

At the same time, the Fund contributed $100 for

an 80% interest in the partnership and assumed no risk with
respect to the loan.

This construction of the agreements would

produce an absurd result.

See Cashio v. ShoriakP 481 So. 2d

1013, 1016 (La. 1986) ("If a literal interpretation will lead to
absurd consequences, then the court can go beyond the forced
meaning and consider all pertinent facts.").

If Mr. Stangl

wanted to enter into a simple "loan" arrangement, he could have
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done so without giving away property worth $500,000.

At the very

least, this creates a latent ambiguity as to the meaning of the
documents.

Accordingly, the lower court should have allowed

extrinsic evidence in order to explain the parties1 true intent.
The trial court erred by refusing to consider extrinsic
evidence in determining the intent of the parties because the
parties1 actions created an ambiguity.

Up until the time the

partnership began to lose money, both parties treated the transaction as an equity investment.

Only when the Fund realized that

its investment was not going to be fruitful did it assert that
this transaction was only a loan.

(Testimony of Stangl, Trial

Transcript of January 30, 1991, at 88.)
There is evidence that the parties intended the loans
themselves to be the capital contribution of the Fund.

The Fund

contends that its capital contribution was valued at $100 and was
its willingness to make the loans.

Stangl obviously believed

differently as set forth in his testimony quoted in Point I.A.
Even William Chipman, however, testified as follows:
Q.

[by Mr. Marshall]

My question is: Did the Retirement

Fund and the limited partnership—excuse me.

Strike that.

Did the Retirement Fund and Price K.M. ever enter into an
agreement in writing for an additional contribution from the
Retirement Fund?
A.

Yes.

There was a second letter of financing that was

additional capital.
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Q.

I'm talking about not the second loan in 1985; I'm

talking about additional capital contribution in the
partnership over the one hundred—
MR. HUNT: Well, objection.

Counsel is testifying,

your honor.
THE COURT: Well, the objection is overruled.
Obviously, the witness is confusing loan funds with capital
contribution.

So that needs to be clarified for him.

Trial Transcript of January 30, 1991 at 232-33.
Chipman obviously viewed the loan proceeds as a capital
contribution which supports Stangl's contention that the loan was
treated by both Stangl and the Fund as an equity investment and
not as a loan.
Because of this latent ambiguity, the court was in error in
refusing to consider extrinsic evidence.
II.
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN REFUSING TESTIMONY
REGARDING THE LEGALITY OF THE LOAN AGREEMENT.
The trial court erred in not allowing testimony on whether
the loan agreement constituted an ultra vires act because the
appellants had a right to defend against the appellee's claims on
the grounds that the appellee's actions were ultra vires.

The

doctrine of ultra vires provides that any action beyond the scope
of an entity's authority is null and void.
Comm'n. 834 P.2d 1 (Utah 1992).

Weese v. Davis County

In Weese. this Court considered
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whether a contract existed between Davis County and its employees
with respect to merit increases in pay for following years.

This

Court held that because Article XIV, section 3, of the Utah
Constitution prohibited a governmental entity from creating or
incurring any debt in excess of tax revenues for the current
year, the county commission could not bind itself for debts
incurred in subsequent years.

Because the contract at issue

consisted of incurring debt in future years, the county did not
have the right to enter the agreement.

In holding the contract

to be null and void, the Court stated that

fl

[a]ny act by the

county in excess of this authority or forbidden by the Utah
Constitution is null and void as an ultra vires act."

Id. at 3.

In First Equity Corp. v. Utah State Univ.. 544 P.2d 887
(Utah 1975), this Court also stated that a state institution is
subject to the control of the legislature and the laws of this
state and that "a power not granted is a power prohibited."
at 891.

Id.

In First Equity, the plaintiff brought an action against

Utah State University to collect commissions on the purchase of
common stock.

Although the legislature granted Utah State

University the authority to handle its financial affairs, the
Court found that this grant of authority did not include the
authority to invest in common stock.

Consequently, the contract

between the plaintiff and Utah State University was an ultra
vires act and was declared by the court to be null and void.
Court stated that

,f,

[w]here a statute confers certain specific
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The

powers, those not enumerated are withheld.

In other words,

enumeration of powers operates to exclude such as are not enumerated.f"

Id. (emphasis in original) (quoting Van Eaton v. Town of

Sydney, 231 N.W. 475, 477 (Iowa 1930)).
In this case, Utah Code Ann. § 49-9-12(h) (1981) provided
that the Fund could invest only in real estate mortgages which
were secured by the Federal Housing Administration or Veterans
Administration insurance or guaranteed by a corporation approved
by the state commissioner of insurance.
12(h) (1981) (repealed in 1987).

Utah Code Ann. § 49-9-

Although in 1983 the legisla-

ture amended section 49-9-12 to allow the Fund to make any
investment in which a prudent man dealing with the property of
another would invest, this amendment was not effective at the
time the 1983 transaction occurred.
apply.2

It, therefore, cannot

Furthermore, even if it were to apply, the specific

enumeration of authority to invest in certain types of real
estate loans would preclude the Fund from investing in all other
types.

Where there is both a general provision and a specific

provision, the specific provision will govern.
Martin, 813 P.2d 1142, 1145 (Utah 1991).

See Pan Energy v.

Thus, the 1985 loan is

not saved by the 1983 amendment to section 49-9-12.

1

The Fund's ratification argument is really an argument for
retroactive application of a statute.
Unless a statute is
expressly stated to apply retroactively, it can only be applied
prospectively.
Washington National Insurance Co. v. Sherwood
Associates. 795 P.2d 665, 667 (Utah Ct. App. 1990).
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There is no other statute or grant of authority to the Fund
which would have allowed it to invest in any other real estate
mortgages.

The legislatures enumeration of certain types of

real estate loans in which the Fund could invest, operated to
specifically exclude the authority to invest in any other types
of loans.

The "loan" to the partnership in this case was not

secured by FHA or VA insurance and was not guaranteed by a
corporation approved by the state commissioner of insurance.

Any

act by the Fund to make a "loan" of this type would be an ultra
vires act and null and void.
In addition, the doctrine of estoppel cannot give legal
effect to an ultra vires act.

In Town of Gila Bend v. Walled

Lake Door Co.. 490 P.2d 551 (Ariz. 1971), the Arizona Supreme
Court stated that the doctrine of estoppel could not prevent a
person from asserting the defense of ultra vires.

Although the

act complained of in Town of Gila was not ultra vires, the court
stated that
[i]n a proper case, the principles of waiver and estoppel cannot be applied to circumvent stated legislative
intent and policy, nor can a contract which violates [a
statute] and is, therefore, void ab initio be ratified
or approved in any manner by defendant or its officers
or any other persons so as to create an enforceable
liability.
Id. at 558 (emphasis in original).
In the present case, the legislature expressed a clear
intent that it did not want the Fund to invest in real estate
loans that were not secured by Federal Housing Administration or
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Veterans Administration insurance or guaranteed by a corporation
approved by the State Commissioner of Insurance to guarantee
loans.

Utah Code Ann. § 49-9-12(h) (1981).

Although the trial

court may have disagreed with the reasons behind the legislature^ actions, the court cannot replace the legislatures
judgment with its own.

Private individuals and state agencies

also cannot circumvent legislative dictates.

By not allowing the

appellants to introduce evidence on their ultra vires defense
because they accepted the benefits of the contract, the trial
court allowed the Fund to accomplish indirectly what it could not
do directly.

The trial court enforced an illegal contract.

Moreover, because the Fund did not have the legal authority
to make the kind of loan that was made in this case, construing
the transaction as a loan denied giving legal effect to the
transaction.

"This court has long adhered to the principle that

in construing a contract, the construction giving an instrument a
legal effect to accomplish its purpose will be adopted where
reasonable, and between two possible constructions that will be
adopted which establishes a valid contract."
P.2d 1316, 1319-20 (Utah 1976).

Stanal v. Todd. 554

See also Frailey v. McGarry. 211

P.2d 840, 847 (Utah 1949) (if contract can be declared lawful by
any reasonable construction, it is court1s duty to so interpret
it).

The trial court erred by not allowing extrinsic evidence on

whether the documents constituted a "loan," or as Stangl contends, an equity investment.

This construction effectively gave
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the documents no legal effect.

To give the documents legal

effect, the trial court should have allowed extrinsic evidence to
show the parties1 true intent and should have construed the
documents as providing for an equity investment.

This was

authorized by Utah Code Ann. § 49-9-12(m) (1981) (repealed in
1987) and is in accordance with the actions of both parties.
III.
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED BY ALLOWING COMPOUND INTEREST.
The trial court erred by allowing compound interest because
the loan agreements did not explicitly provide for compound
interest.

In Mountain States Broadcasting Co. v. Neale. 776 P.2d

643 (Utah Ct. App. 1989), the court did not allow compound
interest because "the parties [did not] expressly agree[] to
compound interest . . . ."

Id. at 647 (emphasis added).

Mountain States, the interest provision stated that

In

lf,

[t]his Note

shall bear interest upon the unpaid principal balance hereof from
the date hereof until paid, at a rate of ten percent (10%) per
annum.

Should interest not be paid when due, it shall thereafter

bear like interest as the principal.flf

Id. (quoting loan provi-

sion) . As noted by the court, this provision only provided that
unpaid interest would bear interest the same as the principal.
There was no provision which explicitly provided that interest
should be compounded monthly and the court, therefore, did not
allow it.

The court based its holding on the fact that

Utah, compound interest is not favored by the law."
28

ff

Id.

[i]n

In the present case, the interest provisions in the loan
agreements also do not expressly provide for interest to be
compounded monthly.

The provisions state that w[i]n the event

the holder hereof exercises its right to accelerate hereunder,
the entire unpaid principal balance, together with all accrued
but unpaid interest, shall thereafter, until paid, and both
before and after judgment, earn interest at the rate of eighteen
percent (18%) per annum."

There is nothing in this provision

which expressly provides for interest to be compounded monthly.
All that the provision allows is that upon acceleration, accrued
but unpaid interest will be added to the principal and both will
earn simple interest at the specified rate.

Because the interest

provision did not explicitly provide for interest to be compounded monthly, the trial court erred in awarding compound interest.
IV.
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN ENTERING DUPLICATIVE JUDGMENTS.
The Partial Summary Judgment and Order and Decree of Foreclosure included judgment against Franz C. Stangl, III, individually and as personal representative of the Estate of Elizabeth
Ann Stangl, on Plaintiff's Third Claim for Relief for the amounts
of $5,052,383.47 and $247,302.38. These amounts were to bear
interest at the rate of 18% per annum, compounded monthly, until
paid.

In addition, the Fund was awarded interest on the combined

total late charges in the amount of $2,202.50 at the rate of 12%
per annum until paid.

See Partial Summary Judgment and Order and
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Decree of Foreclosure, Exhibit A to the Addendum hereto, at J 3
(hereinafter "Summary Judgment").
The Summary Judgment further provided that any amounts
recovered by the Fund through the foreclosure sale of the subject
property would be credited against the judgment against Stangl,
individually and in his capacity as personal representative of
Elizabeth Ann Stangl's estate.

See id. at 5 5.

Following the entry of the Summary Judgment, the subject
property was sold for $3,500,000.

Post trial, the lower court

awarded the Fund a deficiency judgment against Priceview, Ltd.,
Franz C. Stangl, III, and Price K.M. in the ctmounts of (1)
$2,481,314.16, with interest accruing on $2,479,260.90 at the
rate of 18% per annum from April 1, 1991, compounded monthly, and
interest accruing on $1,683.00 at the rate of 12% per annum from
April 1, 1991, and (2) $342,265.96 with interest accruing on
$340,063.46 at the rate of 18% per annum from April 1, 1991,
compounded monthly, and interest accruing on $2,202.50 at the
rate of 12% per annum from January 31, 1990.

See Judgment,

Exhibit B to Addendum hereto, at 11 1, 2.
The Judgment also provided that the liability of Stangl,
Priceview and Price K.M. was joint and several with the liability
of Stangl under the Summary Judgment.

"Satisfaction of one such

liability shall constitute satisfaction of the other."
3.

Id. at 1

Despite the foregoing language providing that satisfaction of

the Judgment constituted satisfaction of the Summary Judgment and
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vice versa, two judgments for the same liability were entered
against Stangl.

The Summary Judgment was entered against Stangl

as a guarantor and the Judgment was entered against him as a
general partner of Price K.M., the general partner of Priceview.
Nevertheless, the Fund is entitled to only one recovery and it
was improper for the Court to enter duplicative judgments against
Stangl individually given the posture of this case.

The harm to

Stangl is that two judgments exist against him for the same
liability, albeit in his different capacities as guarantor and
general partner.
It was improper for the court to enter the summary judgment
against Stangl as part of the Judgment and Decree of Foreclosure.
Utah Code Ann. § 78-37-1 (1992) provides:
There can be one action for the recovery of any
debt or the enforcement of any right secured solely by
mortgage upon real estate which action must be in
accordance with the provisions of this chapter. Judgment shall be given adjudging the amount due, with
costs and disbursements, and the sale of mortgaged
property, or some part thereof, to satisfy said amount
and accruing costs, and directing the sheriff to proceed and sell the same according to the provisions of
law relating to sales on execution, and a special
execution or order of sale shall be issued for that
purpose.
(Emphasis added).

Section 78-37-2 goes on to provide that

[i]f it appears from the return of the officer
making the sale that the proceeds are insufficient and
a balance still remains due, judgment therefor must
then be docketed by the clerk and execution may be
issued for such balance as in other cases; but no
general execution shall issue until after the sale of
the mortgaged property and the application of the
amount realized as aforesaid.
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While it is true that section 78-37-1 does not by its terms
apply to guaranties, the Fund chose to combine a cause of action
on the guaranty of Stangl and his late wife with its judicial
mortgage foreclosure action.

It was procedurally incorrect for

the court to add a personal judgment against Stangl in the
Judgment and Decree of Foreclosure because section 78-37-1 only
allows the court to enter a judgment "adjudging the amount due"
and ordering the sale of the property.

The court should have

waited until after the subject property was sold at sherifffs
sale to enter a deficiency judgment against Priceview, Price K.M.
and Stangl, and a judgment on the guaranty against Stangl.
Accordingly, the Summary Judgment should be satisfied, but under
no circumstances should there exist two judgments against Stangl
(in whatever capacity) for the same liability.
V.
THAT THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN REFUSING TO RECUSE
ITSELF IS EVIDENT FROM THE COURT'6 BIAS
AGAINST STANGL EXHIBITED AT TRIAL
In the original Brief of Appellant filed March 28, 1991,
Appellants fully brief the recusal issue. The Fund complained in
its responsive brief, however, that the issue was not properly
before this Court. Appellants therefore incorporate its earlier
arguments here.
At trial the lower court exhibited a bias against Stangl
that went beyond ruling in the Fund's favor.

Particularly during

Stanglfs cross-examination of William Chipman as the Fund's
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rebuttal witness, the court displayed inconsistent rulings and an
undue irritation with Stangl and his legal theories.

Stangl was

effectively prevented from cross-examining Mr. Chipman.
Chipman1s cross-examination was as follows:
Q. [By Mr. Hunt]

Mr. Chipman, calling your attention to

Paragraph 4.03 of the partnership agreement, Exhibit P-4, as
I read the first sentence in that paragraph, it says that
the—"As its initial and only required contribution to the
capital of the partnership, the limited partner shall make a
loan to the partnership in the principal sum of up to
$4,350,000 in accordance with the terms, conditions, and
provisions set forth in the promissory note and the
subsequent disbursement agreement attached hereto as
Exhibits B and C, respectively, and which loan shall be
secured by a first and prior trust deed lien upon the
property and all improvements thereon and such other
collateral related to the property as the limited partner
may require."
Is that your understanding of the capital contribution
of The Fund to the partnership?
MR. MARSHALL:

I object to that.

What he understands

is not relevant.
THE COURT:
sel.

Yes.

I think it speaks for itself, Coun-

I don't know what he can answer.

sustained.
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So the objection is

MR. HUNT:

Well, your Honor, Counsel has just been

asking him question after question relating to this
document.
THE COURT:

But he was asking him c[uestions whether it

was altered by other written means.

He was asked:

there a written statement?" And he said: "No."
he asked him there.

"Was

That's all

He didn't ask him to interpret the

provisions of it.
Q. (By Mr. Hunt)

To your knowledge, did The Fund make its

capital contribution to this partnership?
A.

Which capital contribution are you referring to?3

Q.

The ones stated in Paragraph 4.03.
MR. MARSHALL:

Well, I have to object to that question

because—
MR. HUNT:

It's a question of factr your Honor.

Ifm

asking if they made the capital—
MR. MARSHALL:

I object.

It's not an issue in this

case that's ever been raised before.
3

As set forth in Point I.B. above, this question was
significant.
Chipman had testified on direct examination as a
rebuttal witness that "[t]here was a second letter of financing
that was additional capital." (Trial Transcript of January 30,
1991, at 233) . The court noted that the witness was "confusing loan
funds with capital contribution." Id. That is exactly the point.
Stangl maintains that the parties considered the loan funds to be
an equity investment with the risk of loss to be borne by both
parties.
Hence, the provision in the partnership agreement
allowing Stanglfs distribution in kind of partnership assets to the
limited partner if "things went to hell in a handbasket."
(Testimony of Stangl, Trial Transcript of January 30, 1991, at 77).
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Itfs really not an issue.

THE COURT:

THE WITNESS:
money.

Yes, they did.

They loaned them the

They paid the $100. At least nobody has ever denied

it.
Q. (By Mr. Hunt)
THE COURT:
was made s o —
Q.

The $100 was the agreed value?
Well, whatever it says. Anyway, the loan

Go ahead.

(By Mr. Hunt)

Put your next question.

Mr. Chipman, you agree with Mr. Johnson

that this property was treated as an equity by The Fund;
isn't that correct?
MR. MARSHALL:
immaterial.

Well, I object again.

Irrelevant and

Parol evidence.

THE COURT:

Objection sustained.

I do that on the

ground what his category or even what the Fund's category of
treatment as far as their internal operation is concerned
does not change the legal obligations on the parties as
reflected by the documents they executed.

You could call it

anything you want and it still wouldn't change the legal
obligation.

So that's the reason that the Court is sustain-

ing the objection.
Q.

(By Mr. Hunt)

Mr. Chipman, you agree that The Fund

periodically—in fact, The Fund had a policy that it would
from time to time actually sell the property or sell one of
its equities at an amount that constituted a loss to The
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Fund, if that was considered in the long-term best interest
of the Fund; isn't that correct?
MR. MARSHALL:
THE COURT:

Objection, irrelevant and immaterial.

Yes. Thatfs irrelevant, Counsel, what they

would do on another transaction.
material.

I can't see where that's

So objection is sustained.

MR. HUNT:

I have no further questions, your Honor.

(Trial transcript of January 30, 1991 at 234-37 (emphasis
added)).
As set forth in Point I of this brief, the parties' conduct
with respect to the loan transaction was indeed relevant and
established an ambiguity in the transaction.

The court not only

erred in refusing to hear or consider testimony concerning the
way the Fund characterized the loan, the court displayed an undue
intolerance of Stangl and his position.

Harboring such strong

feelings and an apparent inability to impartially consider
Stangl's case, the court should have recused itself.
CONCLUSION
Based on the arguments contained in this Brief, the original
Brief of Appellant and Reply Brief of Appellant filed March 28,
1991, and June 17, 1991, respectively, Defendants respectfully
request this Court to reverse and remand with the following
instructions to the trial court:

(1) allow and consider evidence

of the parties' intent in entering the partnership agreement and
loan documents; (2) allow and consider evidence and law
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concerning the legality of the loan; (3) change the interest on
any judgment to simple interest; (4) order the entry of a
satisfaction of the summary judgment so that there are not
duplicate judgments against Stangl; and (5) order Judge Bunnell
to recuse himself from further trial or pre-trial proceedings.
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED this ^ 0

day of October, 1992.

CAMPBELL MAACK & SESSIONS
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IN THE SUPREME COURT
STATE OF UTAH
UTAH STATE RETIREMENT BOARD, as
trustee Of UTAH STATE RETIREMENT
FUND, a common trust fund,
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Case No. 900302
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PRICEVIEW, LTD., a Utah limited
partnership; PRICE K.M., a Utah
limited partnership; FRANZ C.
STANGL, III, individually and as
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Estate of ELIZABETH ANN STANGL; and
JOHN DOES 1 THROUGH 20,
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Tab A

VAN COTT, BAGLEY, CORNWALL & MCCARTHY
Alan L. Sullivan (3152)
R. Stephen Marshall (2097)
Attorneys for Plaintiff
50 South Main Street, Suite 1600
P. 0. Box A5340
Salt Lake City, Utah 84145
Telephone: (801) 532-3333
IN THE SEVENTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF CARBON COUNTY
STATE OF UTAH
UTAH STATE RETIREMENT BOARD,
as trustees of UTAH STATE
RETIREMENT FUND, a common
trust fund,

PARTIAL SUMMARY JUDGMENT
AND ORDER AND DECREE
OF FORECLOSURE

Plaintiff,
vs.

Civil No. 15620

PRICEVIEW LTD., a Utah
limited partnership;
PRICE K.M., a Utah limited
partnership; FRANZ C.
STANGL, III; ELIZABETH ANN
STANGL; and JOHN DOES 1
through 20,
Defendants.

The Court, having entered its Memorandum Decision on
plaintiff's Motion for Summary Judgment, dated October 19,
1989, and good cause appearing,
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED, ADJUDGED, AND DECREED as follows
1.

Defendant Priceview Ltd. owes the following

amounts to plaintiff on the First Claim for Relief of
plaintiff's Amended Complaint;

EXHIBIT NO. A

Principal
Interest through 6/1/89
Late Charges
Interest on late charges through
11/10/89
Less payment from Receiver

$4,204,112.64
971,442.58
1,683.00

TOTAL

$5,052,383,47

145.25
(125,000.00)

Interest shall accrue on the total amount of $5,052,383.47 at
the rate of eighteen (18) percent per annum from June 1, 1989,
compounded monthly, until paid in full.
2.

Defendant Priceview Ltd. owes the following

amounts to plaintiff on the Second Claim for Relief of
plaintiff's Amended Complaint:
Principal
Interest through 6/1/89
Late Charges
Interest on late charges
through 11/10/89

$159,883.23
85,216.65
2,027.52

TOTAL

$247,302.38

174.98

Interest shall accrue on the total combined amount of principal
and accrued interest in the amount of $245,099.88 at the rate
of eighteen (18) percent per annum from June 1, 1989,
compounded monthly, until paid in full.

Interest shall accrue

on the combined total of late charges and accrued interest
thereon in the amount of $2,202.50 at the rate of twelve (12)
percent per annum, simple interest, from the date of this
Judgment until paid in full.

-2-

3-

Plaintiff is awarded judgment against defendant

Franz C. Stangl, III, individually and as personal
representative of the Estate of Elizabeth Ann Stangl, on the
Third Claim for Relief of the Amended Complaint, which shall be
joint and several with the judgment against Priceview Ltd., for
the following amounts:
A.

On the First Note dated February 28, 1983:
Principal
Interest through 6/1/89
Late Charges
Interest on late charges through
11/10/89
Less payment from Receiver

$4,204,112.64
971,442.58
1,683.00

TOTAL

$5,052,383.47

145.25
(125,000.00)

Plaintiff is entitled to interest on the total judgment amount
of $5,052,383.47 at the rate of eighteen (18) percent per annum
from June 1, 1989, compounded monthly, until paid in full.
B.

On the Second Note dated March 12, 1985:
Principal
Interest through 6/1/89
Late Charges
Interest on late charges
through 11/10/89

$159,883.23
85,216.65
2,027.52

TOTAL

$247,302.38

174.98

Plaintiff is entitled to interest on the total combined amount
of principal and accrued interest in the amount of $245,099.88
at the rate of eighteen (18) percent per annum from June 1,
1989, compounded monthly, until paid in full.

-3-

Plaintiff is

further entitled to interest on the combined total of .late
charges and accrued interest thereon in the amount of $2,202.50
at the rate of twelve (12) percent per annum from the date of
this Judgment until paid in full.
4.

Determination of the amount of plaintiff's

reasonable attorneys' fees is reserved and shall be determined
at an evidentiary hearing at which plaintiff shall have the
burden of establishing the amount of its reasonable attorneys'
fees.
5.

Any amounts received by plaintiff through the

foreclosure sale of the subject real property shall be credited
toward the Judgment against Fran;: C. Stangl, III, individually
and as personal representative of the Estate of Elizabeth Ann
Stangl.
6.

The property described in the First Deed of Trust

dated February 28, 1983, and Second Deed of Trust dated March
12, 1985, and hereinafter more particularly described, or such
portions thereof as may be sufficient to pay the amounts found
to be due and owing under this Judgment, and the accruing costs
herein, and expenses of sale, shall be sold at public auction
by the sheriff of Carbon County, State of Utah, in the manner
prescribed by law for such sales.

The Sheriff, out of the

proceeds of such sale shall retain first his costs,
disbursements, and commissions, and then shall pay to

-4-

plaintiff, or to its attorneys, the accrued and accruing costs
of this action, then such sums for plaintiff's attorneys1 fees,
then the amount owing to plaintiff for principal, interest,
costs, and expenses, or so much of such sums as such proceeds
will pay, and the surplus, if any, shall be accounted for and
paid over the the Clerk of this Court subject to this Court's
further order.
7.

All persons having an interest in the subject

premises shall have the right, upon producing satisfactory
proof of interest, to redeem the same within the time provided
by law for such redemption.

From and after the expiration of

the period of redemption, as provided by law, all defendants
and each of them, and all persons claiming by, through, or
under them, and any other person or entity shall be forever
barred and foreclosed of all right, title, interest, and estate
in and to the subject premises and from and after the delivery
of the Sheriff's Deed to the subject premises the grantee named
therein shall be given possession thereof.
8.

The issue whether any of defendants shall be

liable for any deficiency judgment following the foreclosure
sale of the subject property is reserved pending trial of the
issue whether or not plaintiff's actions impaired the value of
the subject property sufficiently to relieve defendants from
responsibility for payment of a deficiency judgment.
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9.

The subject real property described in the First

and Second Deeds of Trust is located in Carbon County, State of
Utah, and is more particularly described as follows:
Beginning at a point on the South line of a
highway right-of-way and the West line of a
street, said point being North 827.95 feet and
West 1677.63 feet from the Northeast corner of
Sunset View Subdivision, said Northeast corner of
Sunset View Subdivision said to be South 945.23
feet and West 339.30 feet from the Northeast
corner of Section 20, Township 14 South, Range 10
East, Salt Lake Base and Meridian, running thence
South 89°26,13M West 502.17 feet along the South
line of said highway; thence South 9°38f59" East
446.94 feet; thence Southeasterly 510.12 feet
along the arc of a 636.197 foot radius curve to
the left (long chord bears South 32°37f14" East
496.57 feet); thence South 55°35'29M East 91.37
feet; thence North 14°48,42M West 61.24 feet;
thence North 55°35,29M West 45.00 feet; thence
Northwesterly 5.00 feet along the arc of a
596.197 foot radius curve to the right (long
chord bears North 55°21,05M West 5.00 feet);
thence East 444.13 feet; thence North 429.092
feet; thence Northwesterly 533.19 feet along the
arc of a 413 foot radius curve to the right (long
chord bears North 37°34f27M West 496.925 feet);
thence North 0°35,21M West 5.02 feet to the point
of beginning.
10.

Plaintiff is entitled to its post-judgment costs

and a reasonable attorneys' fee, as shall be shown by affidavit
of plaintiff or its counsel.
11.

Defendant Priceview Ltd. was terminated and

dissolved June 7, 198S.
DATED this _ 3 / "day of j^c^yfiidtlJLt

-6-

1990.

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I hereby certify that I caused a true and correct copy
of the within and foregoing Partial Summary Judgment to be hand
delivered this

day of January, 1990, to the following:
George A. Hunt
Kurt M. Frankenburg
Snow, Christensen & Martineau
10 Exchange Place, 11th Floor
P. 0. Box 45000
Salt Lake City, Utah 84145

pyuwu^l

9644m
011890
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VAN COTT, BAGLEY, CORNWALL & MCCARTHY
R. Stephen Marshall (2097)
Attorneys for Plaintiff
50 South Main Street, Suite 1600
P. O. Box 45340
Salt Lake City, Utah 84145
Telephone:
(801) 532-3333
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IN THE SEVENTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF CARBON COUNTY
STATE OF UTAH
UTAH STATS RETIREMENT BOARD,
as trustees of UTAH STATE
RETIREMENT FUND, a common
Trust fund,

JUDGMENT

Plaintiff,
vs.

Civil

No.

15620

PRICEVIEW LTD. , a Utah
limited partnership;
PRICE K. M. , a Utah limited
partnership; FRANZ C.
STANGL, III; ELIZABETH ANN
STANGL; and JOHN DOES 1
through 20,
Defendants.
The Court having entered its Findings of Fact and
Conclusions of Law in the above-captioned action, and good cause
appearing,
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED, ADJUDGED, AND DECREED that
plaintiff Utah State Retirement Board is awarded judgment
against defendants Priceview Ltd., Price K. M. , and Franz C.
Stangl, III, jointly and severally, as follows:
1.

Plaintiff is awarded judgment against defendant

Priceview Ltd.:

EXHIBIT NO. _ £

(a)

On the First Claim for Relief of plaintiff s

Amended Complaint for the following amounts:
Principal

$4, 204, 112. 64

Interest through 4/1/91
Late charges

2,163,548.26
1,683.00

Interest on late charges
through 4/1/91

370.26

Less payments from
Receiver:
10-24-89

(125, 000.00)

1-22-90

(60, 000.00)

3-12-90

(203,400.00)

Less proceeds of Sheriff s
sale
TOTAL

(388,400.00)
f3.500.00.00)
$2, 481, 314. 16

Interest shall accrue on the total amount of
$2,479,260.90 at the rate of eighteen percent (18%)
per annum from April 1, 1991, compounded monthly,
until paid in full.

Interest shall accrue on the late

charge in the amount of $1,683.00 at the rate of
twelve percent (12%) per annum, simple interest, from
April 1, 1991, until paid in full.
(b)

On the Second Claim for Relief of

plaintiff s Amended Complaint for the following
amounts:

-2g:\wpI\088\00000up8.W5l

Principal

$159,883.23

Interest through 4/1/91
Late charges

180,180.23
2,027.52

Interest on late charges
as per Judgment
of 1-31-90
TOTAL

174. 98
$342,265.96

Interest shall accrue on the total combined
amount of principal and accrued interest in the amount
of $340,063.46 at the rate of eighteen percent (18%)
per annum from April 1, 1991, compounded monthly,
until paid in full.

Interest shall accrue on the

combined total of late charges and accrued interest
thereon in the amount of $2,202.50 at the rate of
twelve percent (12%) per 'annum, simple interest, from
January 31, 1990, (the date of the prior judgment)
until paid in full.
(c)

On the Fifth Claim for Relief of plaintiff's

Amended Complaint for the following amounts:
Principal

$33,926.00

Accrued interest through
4/1/91

23,756,78

TOTAL

$57,682.78

Interest shall accrue on the total combined
amount of principal and accrued interest of $57,682. 78
from the date of this Judgment at the rate of twelve
-3f:\wpl\088\00000up3.WSl

percent (12%) per annum, simple interest, until paid
in full.
2.

Plaintiff is awarded Judgment against defendants

Franz C. Stangl, III, and Price K. M. , jointly and severally, on
the Eighth Claim for Relief of plaintiff' s Amended Complaint for
the amounts set forth in Paragraph 1, above, including the
amounts awarded under the First, Second, and Fifth Claims for
Relief.
3.

The liability of defendants Franz C. Stangl, III,

Priceview Ltd., and Price K. M. for the judgment amounts on the
First and Second Claims for Relief of plaintiff' s Amended
Complaint, as set forth above in Paragraphs 1(a) and (b), is
joint and several with the liability of defendant Franz C.
Stangl, III, under the Partial Summary Judgment and Order and
Decree of Foreclosure, filed January 31, 1990.

Satisfaction of

one such liability shall constitute satisfaction of the other.
4.

Judgment is awarded against defendants Priceview

Ltd., Price K. M. , and Franz C. Srangl, III, jointly and
severally, for plaintiff1 s attorneys' fees in the amount of
$88,129.60 and costs in the amount of $572.40.
5.

IT IS FURTHER ORDERED THAT THIS JUDGMENT SHALL BE

AUGMENTED IN THE AMOUNT OF REASONABLE COSTS AND ATTORNEYS' FEES
EXPENDED IN COLLECTING SAID JUDGMENT BY EXECUTION OR OTHERWISE
AS SHALL BE ESTABLISHED BY AFFIDAVIT.

-4f:\wpl\088\00000up8. WSi

DATED this f n

day 0 ^ ^ ^ 7 1 9 9 1 .
BY THE COURT:
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CERTIFICATE QF SERVICE
I hereby certify that I caused a true and correct copy
of the within and foregoing Judgment to be hand-delivered this
\H

day of April, 1991, to the following:
George A. Hunt
Williams & Hunt
257 East 2nd South, Suite 500
P. O. Box 45678

esou^'wii
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VAN COTT, BAGLEY, CORNWALL & MCCARTHY
R. Stephen Marshall (2097)
Attorneys for Plaintiff
50 South Main Street, Suite 1600
P. O. Box 45340
Salt Lake City, Utah 84145
Telephone:
(801) 532-3333
IN THE SEVENTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF CARBON COUNTY
STATE OF UTAH
UTAH STATE RETIREMENT BOARD,
as trustees of UTAH STATE
RETIREMENT FUND, a common
Trust fund,
Plaintiff,
vs.

)
)
)
)
)
)

PRICEVIEW LTD., a Utah
limited partnership;
PRICE K. M. , a Utah limited
partnership; FRANZ C.
STANGL, III; ELIZABETH ANN
STANGL; and JOHN DOES 1
through 20,
Defendants.

FINDINGS OF FACT AND
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW

Civil No. 15620

)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)

The above-captioned action came on for trial before
the Honorable Boyd Bunnell, of the above-entitled Court, on
January 30, 1991.

The Court previously entered Memorandum

Decision on Plaintiff s Motion for Summary Judgment, filed
October 19, 198 9.

On January 31, 1990, the Court entered its

Partial Summary Judgment and Order and Decree of Foreclosure.
At the trial of this action, plaintiff was represented by R.
Stephen Marshall, of the law firm of Van Cott, Bagley, Cornwall
& McCarthy.

Defendants were represented by George A. Hunt and

Kurt M. Frankenburg, of the law firm of Snow, Christensen &
g \wpl\OS8\OOOOOup3.W5i

EXHIBIT Mn

C

Martineau.
exhibits.

The parties called witnesses and introduced
Following the trial the parties each submitted post-

trial memoranda.

Having considered its previous rulings

together with the evidence presented at trial and the arguments
of counsel, and good cause appearing, the Court does hereby
enter its Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, as follows:
FINPiyg? Q? FACT
1.

Pursuant to the Court' s Partial Summary Judgment

and Order and Decree of Foreclosure, filed January 31, 1990, th€
subject property was sold by the Sheriff of Carbon County at a
public auction on March 12, 1990, for the sum of $3,500,000.00.
Plaintiff also received from the receiver the sum of $60,000.00
on January 22, 1990, and the sum of $203,400.00 as of March 12,
19 90, which were applied against the Partial Summary Judgment
and Order and Decree of Foreclosure.
2.

Plaintiff and defendant entered into a Limited

Partnership Agreement (Exhibit P-4), under which defendant Price
K. M. was the sole general partner and plaintiff was the sole
limited partner.

Paragraph 7 of the Limited Partnership

Agreement between plaintiff and defendant Priceview Ltd.
provided that plaintiff was to receive a percentage of the net
cash receipts.
3.

Priceview Ltd. failed to pay to plaintiff the sun

of $24,767.00 due under that provision of the Limited

-2g \wpt\088\00000upS WS1

Partnership Agreement for the year 1983, and the sum of
$9,159.00 due for the year 1984.
4.

Defendant Stangl, on behalf of Priceview Ltd. ,

admitted at trial that the payments due under the Limited
Partnership Agreement were not made, but contended that the
money was used for the mutual benefit of the partnership.

This

fact would not relieve the partnership from the contractual
obligations as stated in the Limited Partnership Agreement.
5.

At all relevant times, defendant Price K. M. , a

Utah limited partnership, was the sole general partner of
Priceview Ltd.
6.
III,

At all relevant times, defendant Franz C. Stangl

was the sole general partner of Price K. M.
7.

Defendants contended that plaintiff breached its

duty of care as a lender and interfered with their operation of
the shopping center to the extent that defendants were unable t
properly manage the property, and that this prevented them fron
making the payments on the promissory notes and further
prevented them from disposing the property in order to pay off
the notes in full.
8.

Defendants failed to introduce any evidence to

substantiate these claims.

No evidence was presented to show

that the actions of the plaintiff in any way impaired the valu
of the pledged property, diminished the income, or prevented t
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leasing or negotiation for leases on any of the pledged
property.
9.

Much of defendants' case centered on plaintiff s

alleged failure to cooperate in the sale of the shopping center
together with other property in which the plaintiff had a legal
interest.

Defendants failed to meet their burden of proving

that plaintiff breached any duty to defendants to cooperate wit
defendants in their efforts to sell the shopping center.
10.

The Court finds that plaintiff's counsel

performed legal services as described in the testimony of
plaintiff's counsel and in plaintiff's legal bills.
3. )

(Exhibit P

The Court finds that all of the work performed by

plaintiff s counsel was reasonably necessary to adequately
prosecute the matter.

The Court finds that the billing rates

charged by plaintiff s counsel were consistent with the rates
customarily charged in the locality for similar services.
11.

Based on the evidence presented, the Court finds

that plaintiff s reasonable attorneys' fee for legal services
rendered by its counsel in this action through the trial is
$88, 129.60.

The Court finds that this fee is reasonable under

the circumstances of this case.

Although defendants questioned

the reasonableness of some of the charges made by plaintiff,
defendants presented no affirmative evidence to dispute
plaintiff s evidence.

-4S \»o;\088\OOOOOup8.W51

CONCLUSIONS OF LAW
1.

This Court has personal and subject matter

jurisdiction.
2.

Plaintiff is entitled to judgment against

Priceview Ltd. on the Fifth Claim for Relief of plaintiff s
Amended Complaint for breach of the Limited Partnership
Agreement in the total amount of $33,926.00, together with
interest thereon at the rate of ten percent per annum in the
total amount of $23,794.00 as of April 1, 1991.
3.

The fact that the net cash receipts may have bee:

used for the benefit of Priceview Ltd. does not relieve the
partnership from its obligation to pay such sums to plaintiff
pursuant to Paragraph 7 of the Limited Partnership Agreement.
4.

Plaintiff is entitled to a deficiency judgment

against defendant Priceview Ltd. on the First and Second Claims
for Relief of plaintiffs Amended Complaint in the amounts
previously found to be due and owing by the Court in the Partia]
Summary Judgment and Order and Decree of Foreclosure, filed
January 31, 1990, less the amount for which the subject propert:
was sold at the Sheriffs sale of March 12, 1990, and the
amounts paid to plaintiff by the receiver.
5.

Defendant Priceview Ltd. is liable to plaintiff

for plaintiff s attorneys' fees in the amount of $88,129.60 and
for costs in the amount of $572. 40.

-5g \wpl\088\00000utf.WSi

6.

Defendant Price K. M. , as general partner of

Priceview Ltd. and defendant Franz C. Stangl, III, as general
partner of Price K. M. , are jointly and severally liable to
plaintiff on the Eighth Claim for Relief of plaintiff s Amended
Complaint for all amounts for which Priceview Ltd. is liable to
plaintiff, including the amounts described in paragraphs 2, 4,
and 5, above, pursuant to the provisions of the Utah Uniform
Limited Partnership Act, Utah Code Ann. § 48-2-9 (1989), and th<
Utah Uniform Partnership Act, Utah Code Ann. § 48-1-12 (1989).
7.

Defendants did not meet their burden of proving

any of their affirmative defenses.
8.

Plaintiff was under no legal duty or obligation

to give up its individually held assets, namely the neighboring
K-Mart, in order to facilitate defendants1 sale of the shopping
center.

The Court can find no breach of duty on the part of

plaintiff to cooperate in defendants' efforts to sell the
shopping center.
DATED this

day of April, 1991.
BY THE COURT:

Boyd Bunnell
District Judge
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CERTIFICATE QF SERVICE
I hereby certify that I caused a true and correct copy
of the within and foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of
Law to be hand-delivered this 2T_

day of April, 1991, to the

following:
George A. Hunt
Williams & Hunt
257 East 2nd South, Suite 500
P. O. Box 45678

i^y|<yLw l u o ^ / U ,
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IN THE SEVENTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT IN AND FOR CARBON COUNTY
STATE OF UTAH
UTAH STATE RETIREMENT BOARD,
as Trustees of UTAH STATE
RETIREMENT FUND, a common
trust fund,

MEMORANDUM DECISION
ON TRIAL MATTERS

Plaintiff,
vs.
PRICEVIEW LTD,, a Utah limited
partnership; PRICE K.M., a Utah
limited partnership; FRANZ C.
STANGL, III; individually and
as Personal Representative of
the Estate of ELIZABETH ANN
STANGL; and JOHN DOES 1
through 20,

Civil NO. 15620

Defendants.
This case came on regularly for trial before the
Court on January 30, 1991, and the Court heard testimony and
received exhibits relative to the issues to be determined by
the Court at that time.

The Court took the matter under

advisement and rules as here and after stated.
The Court has already made findings on the execution
of the various documents, the default in the payments as
required under those docments, and the establishment of
amounts due from defendants to plaintiff, and other related
matters.

At this trial, .one of the issues tried by the Court

EXHIBIT NO. J i -

was whether Priceview breached the limited partnership
agreement and, if so, what amount is owing to the plaintiff
as a result of the breach.
The Court finds that the limited partnership
agreement between plaintiff and Priceview Ltd. provided that
the plaintiff was to receive a percentage of the net cash
receipts, and those provisions were covered in Section 7 of
the agreement.

The Court further finds that Priceview failed

to pay to the plaintiff the sum of $24,767.00 due under said
provision for the year 1933, and the sum of $9,159.00 for the
year 1984.
The defendant Stangl, on behalf of Priceview, admits
that the payments were not made but contends that the money
was used for the mutual benefit of the Partnership.

This

fact would not relieve the Partnership from the contractual
obligations as stated in the partnership agreement.
The Court has concluded that the plaintiff is
entitled to judgment for the amounts due, together with
interest at the highest legal rate, against the defendant
Priceview in accordance with the executed agreement.
The Court further finds that Price K.M., as a
general partnership of Priceview, and F.C. Stangle, III, as a
general partner of Price K.M., under the provisions of the
Uniform Limited Partnership Act and the provisions of the
Uniform Partnership Act, are obligated to pay these amounts
to the plaintiff.
-2-

The Court therefore authorizes entry of judgment for
these amounts in favor of the plaintiff and against these
defendants,
A second issue tried by the Court was whether the
plaintiff engaged in conduct that impaired the value of the
collateral sufficiently to relieve defendants from
responsibility for payment of a deficiency judgment.
It is the contention of the defendants that the
plaintiff breached its duty of care as a lender, and
interfered with their operation of the shopping center to the
extent that defendants were unable to properly manage the
property, and that this prevented them from making the
payments on the promissory notes and further prevented them
from disposing of the property in order to pay off the notes
in full.
The defendants have failed to introduce any evidence
to substantiate this claim.

No evidence was presented to

show that the actions of the plaintiff in any way impaired
the value of the pledged property, or diminished the income,
or prevented the leasing 'or negotiation for leases on any of
the pledged property.
Much of the defendant's case centered on plaintiff's
failure to cooperate in the sale of the shopping center,
together with other property in which the plaintiff had a

-3-

legal interest.

The plaintiff was under no legal duty or

obligation to give up its individually held assets in order
to accomplish a sale as proposed by defendants.

The Court

can find no breach of duty on the part of the plaintiff to
cooperate in defendant's efforts to sell the shopping center.
Therefore, the Court concludes that the plaintiff is
entitled to a deficiency judgment in accordance with the
amounts previously found to be due and owing by the Court.
Judgment may be taken for these deficiency amounts against
Priceview Limited and Price K.M., and against F.C. Stangl,
III, in accordance with partnership law as stated above.
The Court finds that the loan documents and the
limited partnership documents both provide for payment cf a
reasonable attorney's fee to plaintiff upon breach of those
agreements by the defendants.

The Court further finds that

there has been a breach of the defendant's duties under those
documents, and that the plaintiffs are entitled to a
reasonable attorney's fee and their costs in this proceeding.
The only evidence submitted relative to the amount
of a reasonable attorney's fee was presented by plaintiff.
The defendants questioned the reasonableness of some of the
charges made by the plaintiff, but presented no affirmitive
evidence to dispute those contentions.
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Based upon the evidence before the Court, which the
Court will not herein detail, the Court finds that a
reasonable attorney's fee to be awarded to the plaintiff for
this action and the foreclosure proceedings is the sum of
$88,129.60, and plaintiff is granted judgment against
Priceview Ltd., Price K.M., and F. C. Stangl, III, in
accordance with Partnership Lav;.

Judgment is further granted

for these amounts against F.C. Stangl, III, and against him
as personal representative of the estate of Elizabeth Ann
Stangl, deceased, based upon their unconditional guarantees.
The attorney for the plaintiff is directed to prepare
Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law and a Decree in
accordance with this decision.
DATED this

/

o

day of March, 1991.

CERTIFICATE OF MAILING

I hereby certify that I mailed a true and correct
copy of the foregoing
MATTERS

MEMORANDUM DECISION ON TRIAL

by depositing the same in the United States Mail,

postage prepaid, to the following:
Alan L. Sullivan
R. Stephen Marshall
VAN CCi'T, BAGLEY, CORNWALL & MCCARTHY
Attorneys at Law
50 South Main, Suite 1600
P. 0. Box 45340
Salt Lake City UT
84145
George A. Hunt
Kurt M. Frankenburg
SNOW, CHRISTENSEN & MARTINEAU
Attorneys at Law
10 Exchange Place, Eleventh Floor
Post Office Box 45000
Salt Lake City UT
84145

DATED this

/^A

day of March, 1991.

Secretary

TabE

49-9-11

PENSIONS

49-9-11. Retirement board to control investment of funds — Board
to appoint custodian of funds — Fees. The retirement board shall have
the control of the investment of any and all funds assigned to the retirement board or retirement office for investment The board shall determine
the method of investing the funds to insure the greatest return commensurate with sound financing adequately safeguarded The board may invest
and reinvest the money in the retirement fund or funds and may provide
for the holding, purchasing, selling, assigning, transferring and disposing
of any of the securities and investments in which any of the money of the
fund or funds is invested. The board shall appoint a custodian for the funds
and securities under its control. Pees for such services shall be paid from
the interest earnings of the investment fund.
History: L 1963. ch. 74. § 11:1965, eh. 86.
§1,1971. en. 109. § 3.1980. en. 47. § 1.
Compiler's Notes.
The 1965 amenamem substituted -investment" for "administration' in two places m
the nrst sentence.
The 1971 amendment substituted "insure"
for "ensure" in the secono sentence.

The 1980 amendment subsntuted the list
two sentences for a sentence waich read:
" T h e 5 U t e measurer snail serve without
*»* M a m 6 m of t h e f u M o r funds -"
rff
n.*.
**necove uaie.
Secuon 2 of Laws 1980, ch. 47 provided:
This act snail taxe eiJect July 1,1980."

49-9-12. Investment of funds — Unrated securities — Investments
not subject to control of board. (1) The retirement board may invest
any and all funds assigned to it as set forth as follows:
(a) Bonds or other evidences of indebtedness of the United States or
any of its agencies or instrumentalities when such obligations are guaranteed as to principal and interest by the United States.
(b) General obligation bonds or other evidence of indebtedness of any
state, or of any count}-, incorporated city, town or school district of the
state or territory of the United States, provided said bonds are at the time
of purchase rated within the three highest classifications established by
at least one standard rating service.
(c) Bonds, notes or evidence of indebtedness of any county, municipality, or municipal district utility within the United States, which are payable from revenues or earnings specifically pledged for the payment of the
principal and interest on such obligations, provided that said revenue
bonds are at the time of purchase rated within the three highest classifications established by at least one standard rating service.
(d) Bonds, debentures or other evidences of indebtedness issued,
assumed or guaranteed by any solvent corporation or institution created
or existing under the laws of the United States or of any state, district
or territory thereof, which are not in default as to principal or interest,
provided that said bonds at the time of purchase are rated within the three
highest classifications established by at least one standard rating service.
(e) Equipment trust obligations or certificates secured by an interest
in transportation equipment wholly or in part within the United States
which carry the right to receive determined portions of rental, purchase
124
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or fixed obligatory payments to be made for the use or purchase (or fixed
obligatory payments to be made for the use or purchase) of such transportation equipment, provided that said obligations are at the time of purchase rated within the three highest classifications established by at least
one standard rating service.
(f) Securities of any open-end or closed-end management type investment company or investment trust, participation in common trust funds
or shares, preferred or guaranteed stock, and nonassessable common stock
or shares of any solvent corporation or institution created or existing
unaer the laws of the United States or any state, district or territory
thereof, provided that said stocks are at the time of purchase rated within
the three highest classifications established by at least one standard rating
service.
(g) Obligations issued or unconditionally guaranteed by international
development lending institutions of which the United States is a member
ana whose obligations are qualified for investment by national banks.
'h) Real estate mortgages secured by Federal Housing Administration
(FHA) or Veterans Administration (VA) insurance or guaranteed commitments or notes secured by mortgages or trust deeds on real estate which
are guaranteed as to payment of interest and principal by a corporation,
approved by the state commissioner of insurance, which is licensed to do
business in the state of Utah as an insurer and which has assets of $50
million or more and that the corporation insurance exposure at the time
of note purchase is limited to not more than 25 times the value of capital,
surplus and contingency reserves.
(i) Saving deposit or certificate of deposit of a bank insured by the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation, or to the extent that they are insured
:n snares or accounts of either state chartered or federal chartered savings
and loan and building and loan associations which are insured by the Federal Savings and Loan Insurance Corporation.
fj) The interest in or portion of notes, obligations or other written evidence of indebtedness used as collateral for loans and which are guaranteed by any authorized agency of the United States government as to
payment of principal, interest or rents.
flu Bonds or other evidence of indebtedness issued or guaranteed by an
agency or instrumentality of the United States, including, but not limited
to, the guaranteed portion of loans guaranteed by any such agency or
instrumentality.
(1) Unrated securities which would otherwise qualify for purchase by
the board under subsections U) (b), (c), (d), (e) or (f) of this section, where
such unrated securities are found by the board to be of a quality equal
to securities rated within the three highest classifications as required of
rated securities.
to) Real estate for the production of income and use not to exceed 15%
of the book value of the investment portfolio. Buildings may be purchased
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PENSIONS

or land acquired and new buildings constructed. At least two certified
appraisals are required for purposes of determining portfolio market values.
(2) Investments shall not be subject to the control of the board of
examiners.
History. L 1963. ch. 74. § 12:1965. ch. 86, erai national mortgage associations, fanners
§ 1:1973. ch. 98. § 3; 1975. ch. 91. 5 3:1975, ch. home administration notes, and banks for
co-operatives" from the end of subd. (IKa);
148. S1; 1979. ch. 172. § 1.
substituted "international development lendCompiler's Notes.
ing institutions of which the United States is
The 1965 amendment added "or as set a member and whose obligations are qualiforth as follows'* to the first sentence: and fied for investment by national banks'* in
inserted subds. (a; through (i) and present subd. ilMgJ for "International Bank for
Reconstruction and Development, or the
subd. tl).
The 1973 amendment deleted "is accord- Inter-American Development Bank"; inserted
ance with investments approved for invest- subd. ilUk;; inserted designation of subd.
ment of the Utah School Employees Retire- (IXl); and made minor changes in phraseolment Funds, or Utah Public Employees' ogy.
Retirement Funds or" after "assigned to it"
The 1975 amendment by chapter 148
in the nrst sentence; added "or note secured • inserted subd. (l)(m); and maae minor
" " contingency reserves" at the end of subd. changes in phraseology.
(hi; inserted suod. ij); and made minor
The 1979 amendment substituted " 1 5 ^ "
changes in phraseology, punctuation and for "1 4 V in the first sentence of subd.
styie.
U)(mi; and substituted "market values" for
The 1975 amendment by chapter 91 "limitations" in the third sentence of subd.
inserted the subsection designations tl) and (lHmi.
(2); deleted "or by any agency or instrumentality thereof, inciuding obligations of the Effective Date.
federal ianc banks, federai intermediate
Section 2 of Laws 1979. ch. 172 provided:
credit banks, federal home owned banks. fed- 'This act shall take effect July 1,1979."

49-9-13. Budget. The director shall prepare an annual administrative
budget covering the anticipated administrative costs of [the] Utah state
retirement office for the forthcoming fiscal year and present the same to
the Utah state retirement board for its examination and approval. Upon
approval by the board the budget shail be submitted to the governor and
the legislature for their examination and approval.
History: L. 1963. ch. 74. § 13; 1965. ch. 56.
§ 1; 1969. cz. 124. § 1.
Compiler's Notes.
The 1965 amendment rewrote this section
which previously provided for payment and
proration of administrative expenses by the
board, assessment of members of retirement
systems without funds, and approval of the
administrative budget oi the retirement
orlce.
The 1969 amendment substituted "and the
legislature for their examination and
approval" in the second sentence for "for his
renew and approval and thereafter may be
erpended as herein provided"; and deleted a
sentence providing for adjustment of the

budget in the event of new or unanticipated
programs.
The bracketed word was inserted by the
compiler.
Repealing Clause.
Section 2 of Laws 1969. ch. 124 provided:
"Section 49-10-54, Utah Code Annotated 1953.
as enacted by chapter 106. Laws of Utah
1957. is hereby repealed."
Effective Dates.
Section 2 of Laws 1965. ch. S6 provided
that the act should take effect upon approval.
Approved March 18.1965.
Section 3 of Laws 1969. ch. 124 provided:
T h i s act shall take effect on July 1.1969."
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ve director — Removal —
- Responsibilities — Emexecutive director to administer
o removal by the board for cause.
5r are as follows:
)f the retirement board and the
systems, and functions assigned
the approval of the board adminluthonty granted by the respecanous retirement statutes:
oard any appeals received from
by the retirement office, or any
ig of the director, and to arrange
led party or parties:
he Legislature, and its agencies,
is, and groups informed on the
snt Office, including the operaand programs acministered by
egislative changes deemed necitutes,
mt legislation or proposed iegisiual administrative oudget cov& Retirement Office and upon
jquent expenditures of the bua> of the budget staff personnel
rement systems and funds asel may include actuaries, attorcounselors. accountants, and
)lish the purpose of the retiretor shall be estaDhshed bv the
3.
ces of the introauctory paragraph to
t single sentence 3UDsmu:,ng '*ho
jbr 'He snail" cieietec "set forth"
"aa follows" in the s»econa sentence of

the introductory paragraph; deleted "to adnumater" at the end of Subsection (2); deleted
"and regulations aa are deemed necessary or
deeirabie, and" after "rules" in Subeecuon
(3); substituted "of the budget" for "thereof
in Subsection (8); deleted "as is deemed necessary" after "consultants" and "for administration" after "office" in the first sentence of
Subeection (9); deleted "as may be neceaaary"
after "assistants" in the second sentence of
Subeecuon (9); added "and shall not be subject to Section 67-£-3" at the end of Subeecuon (9); and made minor changes in phraseology and punctuation.

49-9-12 -

Right to appoint attorneys.
The attorney general does not have exclusive constitutional authority to act aa legal
adviser to the state retirement board: therefore, the provision of this section authorizing
the appointment of attorneys does not violate
Art. VII, § 16 of the state constitution; furthermore, this section provides an exception
to the general authority of the attorney general to perform legal services for any agency
of state government. Hansen v. Utah State
Retirement Bd. (1982) 652 P 2d 1332.

49-9-12. Investment of funds — Unrated securities — Investments not subject to control of board.
(1) The retirement board may invest, subject to the standard of a prudent
man dealing with the property of another, any and all funds assigned to it
as set forth as follows:
(a) Bonds or other evidences of indebtedness of the United States or
any of its agencies or instrumentalities when such obligations are
guaranteed as to principal and interest by the United States.
(b) General obligation bonds or other evidence of indebtedness of
any state, or of any county, incorporated city, town or school district of
the state or territory of the United States, provided said bonds are at
the time of purchase rated within the three highest classifications established by at least one standard rating service.
(CJ Bonds, notes or evidence of indebtedness of any county, municipality, or municipal district utility within the United States, which are
payable from revenues or earnings specifically pledged for the payment
of the principal and interest on such obligations, provided that said
revenue bonds are at the time of purchase rated withm the three highest classifications established by at least one standard rating service.
<d) Bonds, debentures or other evidences of indebtedness issued, assumed or guaranteed by any solvent corporation or institution created
or existing under the laws of the United States or of any state, district
or territory thereof, which are not in default as to principal or interest,
provided that said bonds at the time of purchase are rated within the
three highest classifications established by at least one standard rating
service.
(e) Equipment trust obligations or certificates secured by an interest
in transportation equipment wholly or in part within the United States
which carry the right to receive determined portions of rental, purchase or fixed obligatory payments to be made for the use or purchase
(or fixed obligatory payments to be made for the use or purchase) of
such transportation equipment, provided that said obligations are at
33
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the time of purchase rated within the three highest classifications established by at least one standard rating service.
(f) Securities of any open-end or closed-end management type investment company or investment trust, participation in common trust
funds or shares, preferred or guaranteed stock, and nonassessable common stock or shares of any solvent corporation or institution created or
existing under the laws of the United States or any state, district or
territory thereof, provided'that said stocks are at the time of purchase
rated within the three highest classifications established by at least
one standard rating service.
(g) Obligations issued or unconditionally guaranteed by international development lending institutions of which the United States is a
member and whose obligations are qualified for investment by national banks.
(h) Real estate mortgages secured by Federal Housing Administration (FHA) or Veterans Administration (VA) insurance or guaranteed
commitments or notes secured by mortgages or trust deeds on real
estate which are guaranteed as to payment of interest and principal by
a corporation, approved by the state commissioner of insurance, which
is licensed to do business in the state of Utah as an insurer and which
has assets of $50 million or more and that the corporation insurance
exposure at the time of note purchase is limited to not more than 25
times the value of capital, surplus and contingency reserves.
ii Saving deposit or certificate of deposit of a bank insured by the
Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation, or to the extent that they are
insured m shares or accounts of either state chartered or federal chartered savings and loan and building and loan associations which are
insured by the Federal Savings and Loan Insurance Corporation.
(j) The interest in or portion of notes, obligations or other written
evidence of indebtedness used as collateral for loans and which are
guaranteed by any authorized agency of the United States government
as to payment of principal, interest or rents.
(k) Bonds or other evidence of indebtedness issued or guaranteed by
an agency or instrumentality of the United States, including, but not
limited to, the guaranteed portion of loans guaranteed by any such
agency or instrumentality.
(1) Unrated securities which would otherwise qualify for purchase by
the board under subsections (1Kb), (c), id), le) or (f) of this section,
where such unrated securities are found by the board to be of a quality
equal to securities rated within the three highest classifications as
required of rated securities.
(m) Real estate for the production of income and use not to exceed
15% of the book value of the investment portfolio. Buildings may be
purchased or land acquired and new buildings constructed. At least
34
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two certified appraisals are required for purposes of determining portfolio market values.
(n) Any other investment in which a prudent man dealing with the
property of another would invest.
(2) Investments shall not be subject to the control of the board of examiners.
HUtory: L. 1963, ch. 74, $ 12; 1965, ch.
86, 9 1; 1973, ch. 98, 5 3; 1975, ch. 91, 9 3;
1975, ch. 148, 9 1; 1979, ch. 172, 9 1; 1983,
ch.217,9 1.

Compiler's Notes. — The 19S3 amendment inserted "subject to the standard of a
prudent man dealing with the property of another" in subeec. (1); and added subsec. (lXn).

49-9-14. Life, health, and medical insurance benefits —
Definitions — Duties of State Retirement Office
— Funds — Report
The purpose of this chapter is to provide a mechanism whereby the state
of Utah and its political subdivisions may provide their employees group
health, medical, disability, and life insurance in the most economical and
efficient manner. The Legislature intends that beginning July 16,1977, the
state employees1 group health and medical insurance shall be established
on a self-funded and actuarially sound basis.
The board may assist active and retired members and beneficiaries and
inactive members of the various retirement systems administered under its
direction, to purchase life, health, and medical insurance on a group basis
which can be continued after retirement under such rules as the board may
adopt. The director may employ any personnel, including consultants, as
may be needed to carry out the provisions of this section.
(1) As used in this chapter:
(a) "Employee'' means any employee of any department, agency,
division, institution of the state of Utah, and its political subdivisions.
ibj "Employer" means the state of Utah, its departments, agencies, divisions, and political subdivisions.
(c) "Employee group benefit plans" means any group health,
medical, disability, or life insurance program administered by the
Utah State Retirement Board and approved by the Legislature for
employees of the state of Utah and its political subdivisions.
(2) The State Retirement Office is charged with the following duties
and responsibilities:
(a) to act as a self-insurer of employee group benefit plans, administer those plans, enter into contracts with private insurers to
underwrite employee group benefit plans, and to reinsure those
portions of self-insured plans as considered appropriate;
35
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78-37-1

CHAPTER 37
MORTGAGE FORECLOSURE
Section
78-37-1. Form of action — Judgment — SpeaaJ execution.
76^37-2. Deficiency judgment — Execution.
78-37-3. Necessary parties — Unrecorded
rights barred.
78-37-4. Sales — Disposition of surplus
moneys.
78-37-5. Sales — When debt due in installment*.

Section
78-37-6. Right of redemption — Sales by pareels — Of land and water stock.
78-37-7. Repealed.
78-37^8. Raatrauung possessor from injuring
property.
78-37-9. Attorney fees.

78-37-1. Form of action — Judgment — Special execution.
There can be one action for the recovery of any debt or the enforcement of
any nght secured solely by mortgage upon real estate which action must be in
accordance with the provisions of this chapter. Judgment shall be given adjudgmg the amount due, with costs and disbursements, and the sale of mortgaged property, or some par: thereof, to satisfy said amount and accruing
costs, and directing the shenff to proceed and sell the same according to the
provisions of law relating to sales on execution, and a special execution or
order of sale snail be issued for that purpose.
History: L. 1951. ch. 58. § 1; C. 1943,
Supp- 104-37-1: L 1965. ch. 172. § 1.
Cross-References. — Execution and pro-

ceedings supplemental thereto. Rule 69,
UJLCJ>.
Trust deeds, § 57-1-19 et seq.

NOTES TO DECISIONS
ANALYSIS

Action for denciescv
Appucaoikty of sec: en
Defenses

Exclusive remecv
Exnausuon of secur.ry
Legislative intent.
Loxutanon to sicgie Su::
Nature of acnoc.
Pleaning
Sues.
Service of process.
Action for deficiency.
Former statute heiri not bar to action at law
for deficiency remaining sfter sale under
power in crust deed failed to resin* full
amount of note secured bv sucn deec Mailory
•. Keaaler, 18 Utah 11.54 P. 892.72 Am. St R.
765 (1898).
Applicability of section.
Pledge was not mortgage within meaning of
former § 104-55- L Campbell v. Peter. 108
Utah 565. 162 P.2d 754 '1945'

The rights of a creditor secured by a pledge
of personal property are governed by the Um
form Commercial Code, not this section-1~
neoy T. Bank of Ephrajun, 594 P.2d 881 (U*
1979).
^wThis section applies only to actions i
mortgagors and mortgagees and was not tppIT
cable m a suit by mortgagee for an i
against the purchaser of mortgaged personalty:
Pillsbury Miiis v. Nephi Processing Plant.
Utah 2d 286, 323 P.2d 266 (1958). ?-**
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